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By Dr Paul Winter
“To see where we are going, we must know where we are, and to know where we are, we must discover how we got here”
– General Sir John Hackett, The Profession of Arms, 1983.
PART ONE
‘Corporate Narratives’
The year 2020 marks the eightieth anniversary of the birth and subsequent adoption by the British of the Commando forces concept. It is perhaps no coincidence, therefore, that the current Corps of Royal Marines Commandos, or more specifically the Commandant General and the Royal Marines Board, have decided to evoke the spirit of the wartime Commandos with regards their blue-print for a Future Commando Force (FCF) fit for the 21st Century. In the previous two editions of The Globe & Laurel (May-June and July-August 2019), former CGRM Major-General Charlie Stickland, and his successor in that post, Major-General Matt Holmes, both set out their respective ‘corporate narratives’ for this nascent commando force against a backdrop of rapid modernisation across UK defence as a whole.
Major-General Stickland in his update, ‘Designing for the Future’, stated that he had set in-train a ‘generational change’, aimed at producing ‘5th Generation Commandos’, capable of conducting littoral strike missions, operating in the ‘Grey Zone’ of ‘constant global competition’, and able to ‘deliver early competitive advantage when warfighting with…Allies’.[2] This transformation would, in his view, see the Corps look and operate ‘less like an Army Brigade’ and rather more like a ‘scalable Commando Force exploiting our commando skills…’[3] Yet in order to achieve these desired end-states, the Royal Marines are having to challenge their existing ‘operating concepts…structures and…organisational design’.[4] This represents a clear intent on the part of CGRM and the RM Board to physically, morally and doctrinally dislocate 3 Commando Brigade and its sub-units from their collective ‘norm’, namely the tried and tested Brigade force design, comprising three manoeuvre units and their supporting arms, commanded and controlled by HQ 3 Commando Brigade.
In his inaugural message to the Corps, Major-General Holmes reiterated and re-articulated much of his predecessor’s vision, intent and ‘narrative’ concerning the FCF concept. In particular, Holmes emphasised the importance of returning the Royal Marines to their ‘Commando roots’.[5] Citing the ‘“Affirmation of Royal Marines Commandos”’ produced in 1952, which placed a premium on ‘the roles of raids and sabotage, special tasks as part of a larger amphibious assault, and strategic port or area seizure as the advance force’,[6] Holmes focused in on the skill-sets and capabilities sought in a Commando, namely ‘cross country speed and ability to move silently at night, skill at arms, fieldcraft, small landing craft landings in all weathers, cliff climbing, swimming, endurance and demolition’.[7]
Aside from the detail contained within the official mission statements of successive CGRMs, it is now common knowledge across the Corps that the FCF will be a less conventional entity, and instead a much more innovative specialist force, adept at operating independently in small teams, or Special Purpose Task Groups (SPTGs) of no more than 200 men. Operating across the spectrum of conflict in Future Operating Environments (FOEs), the SPTGs will undertake deception and ‘shaping’ operations, so as to ‘enable’ the ‘mass’ of others; will facilitate ‘theatre entry’ for larger amphibious forces; and will attack key targets such as C2, logistics hubs and lines of communication. The countering of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) defensive screens will also be a priority task for FCF sub-units. All of this, it is affirmed, will occur ‘at reach’ in high-risk environments around the globe.
Perhaps the most significant proposal contained within the FCF design, however, stems from a conscious decision to cease operating in the conventional light and heavy infantry roles, and to preclude itself from relieving Army formations in any future land campaign scenario. Indeed, it is now generally agreed that the Corps has been remiss in pursuing the traditional infantry role at the expense of its own Commando heritage. The professional frustrations generated by protracted operations in Afghanistan, where the character of the fighting negated the employment of traditional commando tactics and skill-sets, thereby obliging the Royal Marines to fight as normal light infantrymen, have merely served to underscore these criticisms. Consequently, there is, at present, a very real appetite in 3 Commando Brigade to ‘go old school’ and reconnect with its commando roots in order to meet the challenges of the 21st Century.
“…a very real appetite in 3 Commando Brigade to ‘go old school’ and reconnect with its commando roots in order to meet the challenges of the 21st Century…”
Yet conversely there exists much apprehension, uncertainty and scepticism as to the wisdom and feasibility of the FCF concept as it currently stands. This is entirely understandable given that at the same time as seeking continuity and legitimacy by means of its Commando legacy, the Royal Marines high command is simultaneously embracing ‘discontinuity’ by breaking with its post-1945 ‘norm’. These cerebral contortions are the bases for a current running joke in 3 Commando Brigade, namely that the Corps is pursuing a ‘back to the future’ policy, whereby it is endeavouring to revisit the past so as to rapidly transform into the future in order to radically alter the present. Yet such collective ‘journeys’, premised as they are on radical transformation, are full of potential psychological and intellectual pitfalls. Consequently, those advocating such a seismic shift in the way the Corps is structured, organised and tasked should be mindful of these dangers, the most prominent of which is the specious and misleading ‘corporate narrative’.
Cynics would argue that due to the ‘unfathomable complexity’ of large organisations, senior leaders who wish to advance a particular transformative narrative, but are themselves perplexed by the labyrinthine nature of their own institution, end up simplifying their message to such a degree that it becomes divested of doubt, ambiguity and incertitude. According to one military commentator, they ‘concoct a story in their head, and then build their visions, strategies and plans on top of that narrative’.[8]
As much is attested to in the official publication Understanding and Decision-Making, the MoD’s current joint doctrine on conceptual matters, which warns that, ‘…narratives can be formed by imagination, myth and stories rather than fact, especially over time’.[9] A toxic by-product of this process is that target audiences become enthralled to a fallacious narrative, a phenomenon known as ‘intellectual capture’.[10] Again, joint doctrine is quite clear on this matter counselling that, ‘Narratives can dominate collective thought, and once ingrained can be very hard to shift’.[11]
Another danger is that it is all too tempting for organisations championing profound change to seek legitimacy for their reforms by means of the highly-subjective use of historical case-studies and ‘facts’. There is an understandable temptation to cherry-pick those aspects of institutional history which support, further and legitimize their narrative or ‘vision’. Yet military organisations simply cannot afford to choose historical facts and figures which fit-in with their own biases, prejudices and preconceptions, while rejecting those that do not. Unsurprisingly, this fundamentally flawed methodology skews reality, and supplies those unwise enough to indulge in such malpractices with the wrong set of answers. In turn, this will lead an organisation to predicate its future restructuring, reorganisation and re-conceptualization on myths, misconceptions and flawed premises.
‘Institutional Memory’ and the ‘Conceptual’ Component
Another set of contributory factors which explain why military institutions fall into the trap of perpetuating false narratives in order to advance their own agendas, flows directly from a confluence of issues originating from the condition of an Armed Service’s ‘institutional memory’. Institutional or ‘corporate memory’ has been defined as the ‘ability of a [military] organisation to retain information to improve strategy, decision making, problem solving [and] operations…’ Yet in 2019 the state of the Corps’ collective historical consciousness is sub-optimal. Decades of under-investment in the ‘conceptual’ component of its ‘fighting power’ has left the Royal Marines particularly vulnerable to corporate amnesia. The failure to routinely study and extrapolate from Post-Exercise Reports (PXRs) and Post-Operational Reports (PORs) at Commando unit and Brigade level, is perhaps symptomatic of this intellectual malaise, as is the deficient condition of the Corps’ Professional Military Education (PME) and Officer Career Development (OCD) programmes.
At present, PME and OCD programmes are placed randomly in the hands of a particular officer appointed to this post by his Unit CO. It would be naïve to believe, however, that those officers responsible for their units’ OCD/PME syllabuses all possess the same levels of experience, education and interest. By inclination, some will be more engaged than others. The current arrangement, dependent as it is on the educational backgrounds and proclivities of unit COs and their designated OCD officers (some of whom are non-graduates), is consequently far too arbitrary in nature, and has bred a multi-speed, de-harmonized, un-coordinated and unregulated modus operandi across the Corps.
Yet with regard to the conceptual component of its fighting power, the Corps could be perceived as being full of paradoxes. On one end of the spectrum the Royal Marines’ ‘corporate memory’, as well as its OCD and PME programmes, are woefully inadequate, and therefore not fit for purpose in the 21st Century. But on the other, the Corps enjoys, in stark contrast to the other three armed services, an above average educational standard across its rank structure with approximately 17% of enlisted men possessing degrees, and a further 40% educationally qualified to be officers.[12] These highly-impressive statistics make the Royal Marines’ present intellectual difficulties even more puzzling and lamentable, for there is clearly a reservoir of untapped, and therefore unrefined, intellectual power laying dormant within the Service.
“…in stark contrast to the other three armed services, an above average educational standard across its rank structure with approximately 17% of enlisted men possessing degrees, and a further 40% educationally qualified to be officers…”
To compound matters, the Royal Marines have traditionally been poorly served by journalists, writers and academics alike, who, largely through self-interest, have eschewed the role of intellectual bodyguards to the Corps, gravitating instead towards the big beasts of UK defence, namely the British Army and Royal Navy, who reward the cheerleading activities of such individuals with patronage and privileges sadly not in the gift of UK Commando forces. In order to off-set this deficiency in intellectual top-cover, the Corps has had to rely on the goodwill and literary talents of former Royal Marines such as Derek Oakley, James D. Ladd, Robin Neillands and Julian Thompson, whose combined efforts have succeeded in chronicling the history of the Royal Marines Commandos up to the year 2000.
Nevertheless, sole reliance on this cottage industry for historical perspectives and insights is a poor substitute for an officially endorsed programme of historical inquiry into the Corps’ past operational activities. This is particularly the case when those responsible for the Corps’ conceptual component have consistently failed to read and digest the fruits of these scholarly labours. It is therefore somewhat ironic and highly-symbolic that the Royal Marines’ own museum should currently be in a state of suspended animation due to financial under-investment. Against this backdrop of relative indifference to its own historical record, and in the absence of a professionalization of the Corps’ educational system, it is perhaps inevitable and understandable that myth, rumour, legend, received wisdom, half-truths, ‘dits’ i.e. story-telling, and plain ignorance have filled the resultant void.
Notably, the Royal Marines’ own ‘dit culture’ may afford a valuable insight into why the Corps is obscurantist in temperament, and lacks a predisposition toward pursuing a systematic examination of its past achievements. According to one authority on the matter, ‘dit culture…is a crucial means by which the Royal Marines communicate to each other the required knowledge, skills but also attitudes which is critical to the performance of their role’.[13] Moreover, ‘A good dit…has an important point’ and ‘embodies and communicates the essential values of the Royal Marines to its members’, as well as constituting ‘an informal and mainly unwritten form of ethos…’[14]
Yet the key question is: is ‘dit culture’ partly the cause of this disinclination to engage academically with the past, it being easier and more convenient to disseminate information through such a casual channel? Or is it a symptom of long-term academic neglect, obliging Marines of all ranks to intellectually extemporize by means of semi-official story-telling? Either way, ‘dits’ are simply no surrogate for a comprehensive, fully joined-up and codified PME programme of study designed to serve the conceptual needs of the Corps in the 21st Century.
As is evident, when an organisation is semi-conscious of, or plain indifferent to, its own corporate history, errors of fact or interpretation are bound to occur when that same organisation draws on its collective past to inform and shape its future. The dangers multiply exponentially when those with a vested interest in mobilising the past to achieve a specific end-state mistake ‘narrative’ for history. As MoD joint doctrine relates, the ‘concept of [a] narrative can play a significant role in understanding’.[15] Yet a faulty one can also act as a prism: refracting, deflecting, bending, polarising and ultimately distorting comprehension. As the FCF programme is currently at a conceptual stage in its development, it is perhaps an opportune moment for its architects to press the pause button and inject some historical reality into proceedings, for one of the persistent criticisms levelled at the FCF project is how light it is on historical perspective, context and precedent.
“…Symptomatic of this ahistorical approach is the Corps’ inability to properly define its own Commando heritage…”
Symptomatic of this ahistorical approach is the Corps’ inability to properly define its own Commando heritage. While adroit at listing the capabilities, functions and future operating requirements of the FCF, Major-General Stickland fell short of defining precisely what a Commando is, despite citing the term eighteen times in his ‘update’. The same applies to Major-General Holmes, whose narrative contained nine iterations of the word ‘Commando’, but was audibly silent with regards its strict historical origins. Such reticence on the part of successive CGRMs to reach a precise definition of the term ‘Commando’ is surprising given the Corps’ vested interest in defending and promoting its own brand name. The absence, however, of an officially endorsed ‘taxonomic description’ of the ‘Commando’ concept has resulted in the word being used liberally in connection with the FCF plan, but with little thought given to its etymological significance.
If, however, a copy of the Oxford English Dictionary is consulted, it becomes patently obvious that the generally accepted definition of the word ‘Commando’ is a ‘unit of shock troops’,[16] a classification first propagated by Brigadier John Durnford-Slater, one-time CO of No. 3 Commando and deputy commander of HQ Special Service Group.[17] Yet the idea that the FCF will revert back to being a ‘shock troop’ formation by revisiting its ‘Commando roots’ is not one being entertained by those currently engineering the FCF concept. In light of this lack of clarity, it is perhaps unsurprising that since the announcement in 2017 that the Royal Marines were to be radically transformed into Future Commando ‘warriors’, the Corps has been suffering from an incipient identity crisis.
© Dr Paul R.J.Winter, 2019
TO BE CONTINUED IN PART TWO
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] General Sir John Hackett, The Profession of Arms, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983), p. 7.
[2] Major-General Charlie Stickland, ‘Update from the Commandant General Royal Marines “Designing the Future”’, The Globe & Laurel: The Journal of the Royal Marines, May/June 2019, Volume CXXVII, No.3, p. 181.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Major-General Matt Holmes, ‘A Message from CGRM’, The Globe & Laurel: The Journal of the Royal Marines, July/August 2019, Volume CXXVII, No.4, p. 273.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Anonymous, ‘Is CGS Really Humble Enough to Allow True Change?’, 30 October 2016, Fall When Hit: A Blog by British Army Heretics, see https://medium.com/@FallWhenHit
[9] Chapter 1: ‘Understanding’, Section 2: ‘The Basics of Understanding’: Understanding and Decision-Making, Joint Doctrine Publication 04, 2ndEdition, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, MoD, 2016, p. 12.
[10] Anonymous, ‘Is CGS Really Humble Enough to Allow True Change?’, 30 October 2016, Fall When Hit: A Blog by British Army Heretics, see https://medium.com/@FallWhenHit
[11] Chapter 1: ‘Understanding’, Section 2: ‘The Basics of Understanding’: Understanding and Decision-Making, Joint Doctrine Publication 04, 2nd Edition, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, MoD, 2016, p. 12.
[12] Lord Burnett, ‘Royal Marines – Question for Short Debate’, The House of Lords, 28 November 2017, Hansard, Volume 787. See https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/2017-11-28/debates/D00C8F33-3C1B-4E95-ADC8-8F03F687FDC6/RoyalMarines.
[13] Dr Anthony King, ‘The Ethos of the Royal Marines: The Precise Application of Will’, Department of Sociology, Exeter University, May 2004, p. 30.
[14] Ibid., p. 29.
[15] Chapter 1: ‘Understanding’, Section 2: ‘The Basics of Understanding’: Understanding and Decision-Making, Joint Doctrine Publication 04, 2nd Edition, Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, MoD, 2016, p. 12.
[16] Oxford Compact Dictionary & Thesaurus, (Oxford: OUP,1997).
[17] Major-General Julian Thompson, The Royal Marines: From Sea Soldier to a Special Force, (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 2000), p. 302.
