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3 Jan 20
By RM Officer
As the Royal Marines continue to search for a way forward with the Future Commando Force (FCF) concept, there is a worrying consistency with which the phrase ‘just take more risk’ seems to be the answer to every problem. I read the article ‘Commando 2035 – Sci-Fi or Reality’, which I think is symptomatic of the risk panacea fallacy that pervades so much of the attitudes to FCF development. In the article it suggested that once successive Commandant General RMs (CGRM) had made the case for accepting greater risk, then the Commando 2035 concept could become a reality – i.e. expand the risk envelope for commandos and FCF’s potential can be unleashed.
Since taking shape, the FCF concept has hit the hard reality that it requires an unprecedented financial investment, beyond what is needed to close current capability gaps. As the Royal Marines appreciate that FCF cannot be realised without this financial investment and boutique equipment programmes, it has resorted to using the ‘taking-more-risk’ approach as the panacea to capability shortfalls. A typical example goes something like this: the FCF concept is about disaggregated small commando teams dispersed over a large area (further than land doctrine would recommend)converging on the objective to generate mass or conducting simultaneous assaults on multiple targets. The detractors would, justifiably, point out several simple issues: how do these teams communicate with one another now they are out of tactical CIS range? What happens if multiple teams sustain casualties? How do we sustain these teams dispersed over a large area with a logistic framework previously built around the echelon system for a battlegroup? All sensible questions. The FCF adherent response goes something like this: we just need to take more risk.For the lack of communications, the FCF units will go on ‘scheduled reports’ (even though ‘skeds’ are not a mitigation for a frail communications network); with the lack CSS coverage, including medical, the way around is to tolerate the risk. The dependence on the ‘risk panacea’ can be explained on a few fronts: first, a wilful attempt to overcome the constraints of in-service capability and a lack of a bespoke equipment programmes to unlock FCF tactical problems; secondly, the erroneous extrapolation of special forces (SF) tactics to an FCF context; and thirdly, wanting to orientate the present day Corps closer to its World War Two commando forebears. All these influences conspire to mislead the Royal Marines about the implications of taking more risk in commando operations.
In ‘The False Promise of Re-organisation’, it is suggested that the Royal Marines are pushing for re-structuring 3 Brigade’s commando groups into FCF units despite a lack of key enabling DLODs that would make the capability credible. For example, without any likely improvement to over-the-horizon surface lift and beyond line of sight communications in the offing, the way around these problems is to assume that raising the risk threshold will mitigate the capability gap. This is a misguided approach. Whilst taking risk is a necessary part of military operations, one would not launch a capability primarily on the basis that more risk is the answer. On the contrary, by enhancing the effectiveness of the capability – in this case FCF – commandos should be used to mitigate or reduce the risk associated with the most challenging operational tasks. For example, in the A2AD scenarios, on which much of the FCF conceptual development is based, the benefit of using multiple dispersed teams is offset by the lack of robust communications and very stretched (and in some cases non-existent) medical timelines. I.e. rather than patiently building FCF capability to properly mitigate and manage the highest risk operations, the ‘risk panacea’ shortcut would make employing an FCF unit a very dangerous endeavour.
This ‘risk-panacea’ thinking is not being helped by drawing lazy parallels with SF’s acceptance of risk. FCF and SF are not the same. Here are two key differences: first, SF operates on a scale rarely greater than a (very small) squadron or troop, whereas the FCF envisages operating at company to unit level; secondly, SF are supported by a disproportionate number of very expensive enablers whereas the Royal Marines are not. To elaborate, the FCF concept imagines multiple SF-like team-sized groupings dispersed across the battlefield – not one or two, but multiple. This will stretch all the enabling elements of the littoral strike group in way that SF operations do not have to contend with. If a lot of risk simultaneously materialises (such as contacts and/or casualties across multiple teams over a dispersed area), then dispersal becomes the FCF’s unit major disadvantage, not its tactical advantage. The lesson from SF experience is that their ability to take on the riskiest operations is, in large part, due to the disproportionate enabling wrap that supports them. Furthermore, because of their relatively small scale, an SF team’s failure is more easily contained and managed. It also helps that Defence does not have to declare SF operations in a way that it would if commandos were deployed. It is, therefore, incorrect to assume the key element of SF’s assignment to the most dangerous tasks is primarily down to a higher risk threshold. Rather it is because of SF’ design, support and operating model that it can afford to take more risk. These are characteristics that will not be shared by commando force anytime soon.
In a similar fashion to the SF-FCF discussion, the inference behind a return to our ‘commando roots’ is hopelessly naïve. If one thinks that adopting a mindset of the risk levels assumed in World War Two is the way forward then, unfortunately, using an FCF unit might be costly in both blood and treasure. As inspiring as the pre-D-Day commando raids may be, they did not really move the drinks trolley any closer to Berlin; no matter how much risk was taken. At best they were strategic distractions and at worse operational and/or tactical folly. I am not suggesting that serving Royal Marines officers are thinking about accepting precisely the levels of risk adopted in World War Two, but by invoking the commando appetite for risk, the Corps might be deceiving itself into believing that risk taking is the answer to the FCF’s capability shortfalls – it is not.
All military operations involve risk and risk should be taken based on sound military judgement. However, using risk as the panacea to paper over the capability cracks is not a pragmatic way to develop capability. On the contrary, this approach is likely to compound, not reduce, the tactical and strategic risk associated with using an FCF unit for the tasks its concept envisages. Also, the FCF debate has not been helped by invoking our ‘commando roots’ too literally and drawing lazy parallels with SF operations. The ‘risk panacea’, therefore, must be avoided if the FCF concept, as it evolves, is to operate within its capability constraints. If this means having to de-scope the FCF ambition commensurate with its actual (not idealised) capability, then so be it lest the Corps is used operationally for a task that is beyond its capabilities. The risk panacea is a pernicious but alluring idea and the Royal Marines must avoid falling into its trap. If it continues to frame risk in this manner, then the Corps will be engaging in professional deceit where prudent military professional sense should instead prevail.
7 comments
I wonder if, rather than aiming for greater assumption of risk, the goal would be greater responsibility? The goal to receive more independent (not in support of any one group) operations defined as kinetic, in order to develop this new doctrine on the ground and in the real world? US Army Rangers and Marine SOF conduct operations in a role independent of traditional SF, not simply providing cordons. To me, they have been given more responsibility to conduct operations, because they are deemed reliable enough to carry out these jobs. Not because they’re willing to take more risk. This environment is surely the best place to develop doctrine over time, in contemporary conflicts.
We have an existing DNA, existing doctrine and a physical presence. Maybe evolution is the correct path rather creation? This offers the chance to try new mutations of what we have, and phase out unwanted characteristics once tried and tested.
Lima Kilo, a point i think which is being made in this and other articles is that we are doing this ‘tail wagging the dog’. we should define the doctrine for how we intend to operate, so that all personnel can train towards (and meet the standard) and then begin buying kit, implementing orbats and vying for ‘SF’ type ops. Build the doctrine and it will come – to coin Field of Dreams. Until that is established no one knows what FCF is or does. Rangers were somewhat lost for a period – until they got 75th into AFG – and MARSOC are experiencing similar spread betting, amounting to questionable output. The current doctrine is not fit for purpose – i would argue it hardly achieves an amphib output – let alone a Special Operations output. It is far too conventional focussed; we are a product of the system afterall. We know the threats, we have a sparse understanding of how to counter them. Lets start to cohere the two into doctrine which sets RM up for success in the future. Agree with your more responsibility point!
I would suggest re-reading the concept of network centric warfare. The communications systems have changed from CW at twelve a minute to totally secure none attributable K band systems. The army is undergoing a type of change similar to that of arrows to gunpowder and Royal is failing to keep track of what is going on. There is a very definite role for Royal but you wouldn’t find it looking at the past.
Couldn’t agree more. Our “Commando Roots” should be used as nothing more than a catchy tag line for media releases. If we are to truly embrace the first ‘F’ in FCF then we need to be unshackled from our history. Everything from doctrine to standards and dress need to be looked at from a perspective of where we want to go, not where we’ve been.
Surely there must be a way to move satellites over a battlefield or put a plane up there with comms. even in this day and age let alone in 10+ years an iPhone has the range. I think that people are trying to make things complicated and not going the other way and simplify things. Also I think that they should ask the mne’s that were on the ground and in the mountains how they overcome problems and what they think that they need.
I’m a 68 year old former bootneck that was in for 25
I think that the Corps is going the right way so long as the political lot and the bean counters don’t interfere
Humphs, that can be done, but planes have limited flight time and are vulnerable to Air Defence. Satellites are a finite resource and many are not enabled for this type of activity – vice US capabilities. UK are currently trialling the Airbus Zephyr system, which looks to give a sub-stratosphere satellite system for an extended period (a few months), which is above most Air Defence. However, this capability is some way off yet and is/will be very expensive. While RM continues to be the illegitimate child of the RN, it does not stand a chance of moving towards capabilities such as this – or indeed others – therefore making FCF a pipedream. I feel this article justifies the need for further investment across all DLODs, which means money is required. The RN have allowed RM to move into a tricky position where by they are tantamount redundant, but do not have the financial support to move into a required area: FCF. SDSR is coming up, which without funding could be disastrous for RM. Note DefSec said RN need to get what they have working, so this may mean no significant funding for FCF…
I would like to highlight the authors point about ‘moving the drink trolley closer to Berlin’. Whilst this may be geographically true a FCF will see you create the pockets/space to exploit for conventional forces, in a campaign such as this; WW2. Thereby offering an action within the manoeuvrist approach for a larger force. Furthermore campaigns like this we may never see again in our lifetime, so we must ensure we offer more than a service to such campaigns. Horizontal escalation as a concept consumes an adversaries capacity elsewhere so as to ensure they cannot resource their main aims – similar to Hezbollah/Iran MO. This then makes their strengths weaker, and ours stronger. This is an avenue we must pursue, as an LCG of circa 1000 will not have the effect we falsely perceive – due to Falklands!